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Abstract
Companies that seek to build buyer-based B2B e-commerce systems face a challenge to estimate the investment
value while the attitude of suppliers toward the participation is full of uncertainty. This research provides an
game-based option valuation approach that clarifies the uncertainties of each investment timing strategies by
analyzing the expected revenue, cost, project risks, and time to the market for both buyers and sellers, which
the buyer can take as a guideline while designing the B2B e-commerce systems. Although the potential of option
pricing models on evaluating IT value is discussed in prior literature, the models are never applied to
evaluating the investment strategy, which the success of the investment depends on the participation of multiple
parties. The model developed examined the effect of counteractions between the supplier and the buyer
underlies a number of findings with potential to assist managers designing a “win-win” investment strategy.
Keywords: Compound option model, B2B electronic commerce, IT investment, supplier participation, game
theory

Introduction
In the context of EDI, there is some evidence to indicate that power and dependence existed in the relationship between the firm
and the partners may have some role in EDI adoption decision (Wey and Gibson, 1991, Saunders and Clarks, 1992, and Hart and
Saunders, 1998). In the buyer-based B2B electronic commerce systems, this power and dependence is usually reflected by the
degree of supplier participation. Whether the supplier decides to immediately join or defer its participation may critically affect
the value of B2B e-commerce systems investment.
However, many buyer-based B2B e-commerce systems have less success to attract suppliers than they expect, because for most
of the suppliers, whether the participation makes economic sense is still a question mark. Although suppliers can gain access to
new customers and reduce transaction costs by participation, they are forced to compete mainly on price, which puts intense
pressure on their margin. They also have to pay the marketplace operators a commission for the privilege of selling. In addition
to that, sharing their product and marketing information through the third party can be harmful to their brand equity. As a result,
some suppliers may decide to defer their participation until most of the uncertainties become clearer.
Since the suppliers’ attitude toward the participation is full of uncertainties, especially in the initial stage of system development,
it causes a lot of problems for the organization to estimate their investment value. First, the predicted benefits may not occur if
the supplier participation is not enough. However, the traditional capital budgeting method, such as NPV assumes all the predicted
benefits will actually occur, not allowing for problems with conversion effectiveness (Locus 1999). Second, NPV assumes that
the interest rate is constant and has no variability. However, if we view the development of B2B e-commerce systems as a form
of ‘two-stage project’, whether the supplier chooses to use the system (second stage investment) adds value to the owner
410
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company’s infrastructure investment (first stage investment). The variability in the supplier side should be different from the
developer side. Thus, the organization is easily biased against funding the B2B e-commerce systems by using NPV analysis. To
solve the problem, a more promising evaluation approach with the concern of supplier participation uncertainties should be built.
But before that, we need to clearly define the different types of uncertainties and their determinants in the development process
of buyer-based B2B e-commerce systems.
Three research questions are expected to answer in this paper:
(1) What are the important determinants of supplier participation in buyer-based B2B e-commerce systems?
(2) Is there any effective approach to estimate the investment value of buyer-based B2B e-commerce systems while taking
the supplier action and competition pressure into concern?
(3) What is the best investment strategy that the developer can choose to enhance the overall payoff for both buyers and
suppliers?
The impact of supplier participation on buyer-based B2B e-commerce investment strategy
Table 1 gives taxonomy of three buyer-based B2B e-commerce systems. The buyer-based web procurement systems creates direct
computer links to a company’s dedicated suppliers so order forms and catalogs are readily accessible online. The focus is put on
a single, well-established buyer, such as Procter & Gamble, that develops a web-enabled procurement system to integrate its entire
procurement process with selected suppliers. Since the relationship between suppliers and buyers are already built under a longterm contract, the environment uncertainty is relative low, however the suppliers may often face high lock-in costs.
Buyer’s own e-marketplaces are implemented by the buyers that do their purchases through their own B2B e-commerce centers.
Many of the best-known players in this arena, such as Wal-Mart’s RetailLink, started out by developing their own B2B e-market
and aggregating suppliers to compete on price. These e-marketplaces are easier to build and operate because there is a clear leader
in the technical and business development. It also has the financial backing of the dominant company, which enables them to
move ahead quickly without worrying so much about short-term profits. However, they are less democratic and whether the
pricing mechanism is fair to suppliers is often questioned. Buyer-jointed industrial e-marketplaces, such as the auto industry’s
Covisint, were developed by groups of buyers in the same industry. Jointly owned by the largest industry players, they have the
advantage of aggregating purchasing power, however they also have their challenges. Suppliers may struggle to collaborate while
competing fiercely for customers, because most of them are not willing to reveal sensitive or proprietary information to their
competitors. In addition, the e-marketplace itself is often the target of government anti-trust claims.
Based on those concerns, we summarize three uncertainties related with supplier participation: uncertainty about the participation,
uncertainty about the connection costs, and uncertainty about the time to participate.
Participation uncertainty: The participation uncertainty directly affects whether the expected revenue will be achieved. The
environment surrounding the supplier and the organization relationship may force or encourage the participation. We discuss three
sources of such participation uncertainty. First is the switch cost. As the supplier has a lot of investments highly specific to the
relationship, it is costly for the supplier to switch to another buyer. Second is the length of the contract. If the supplier has a longterm relationship with the company, it means there exist a direct or indirect promise of guaranteed volumes and repeat business,
which reduces the supplier risk to participate. The last is the ownership participation. The higher the ratio is, the deeper
engagement is between the supplier and the buyer, and the less risk for suppliers to participate.
Cost uncertainty: The flexibility of the supplier IT resource, such as network/telecomm connectivity, platform compatibility, and
data/application modularity, and the level of intra-process or inner-process information sharing affect the cost and time to
incorporate the e-commerce systems into the organization IT infrastructure, and thus affect the value realization of participation.
We discuss two uncertainties related with supplier IT infrastructure: (1) the flexibility of IT and (2) the level of information
sharing.
Time uncertainty: After supplier decides to participate, the next question for them is when is the best time to join. The time may
vary depending upon the trusting climates between the supplier and the buyer. A good trusting climate can reduce the supplier’s
doubt about the buyer proposed benefits and therefore shorten the time to participate. The trusting climate can be measured by
the number of training programs offered to the suppliers for using the B2B e-commerce systems, the availability of incentives
offered to the suppliers to adopt the systems, and the average responding time to supplier’s technical requests.
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Table 1. Taxonomy of Three Buyer-Based B2B E-Commerce Systems
Buyer-based
B2B ECommerce
System

Features

Example

Supplier’s participation risks

Buyer-based
Web
Procurement
Systems

• Building direct links with
dedicated suppliers
• Low uncertain about the
revenue
• Low development costs
• High connection costs

P&G, Dell

• High lock-in costs
• Decreased bargaining power against
buyers
• Integration issues with back-end
systems

Buyer’s own emarketplaces

• Owned and operated by a
single, dominant buyer
• Mid uncertain about the
revenue
• High development cost
• Low connection cost

Wal-Mart’s
RetailLink

• Less democratic, one buyer decides
the technical and business
development
• Intense pressure on price margins
• Pay a commission for the privilege of
selling

E-marketplace
by a
consortium of
buyers

• Developed by groups of
buyers in the same industry
• High uncertain about the
revenue
• Medium development cost
• Low connection cost

Covisint,
Transora

• Intense pressure on price margins
• Pay a commission for the privilege of
selling
• Reluctant to share planning and
inventory information
• Turning over their connection to their
customers to the exchange

Those uncertainties directly affect how the buyers design their investment strategies. There are several key decisions involved
in the development process of buyer-based B2B e-commerce systems. The buyer has to decide when to develop the system and
estimate the expected return after the supplier participates. There are also two decisions for the supplier: the time to participate
the systems and the connection costs to the e-commerce systems. Both supplier and buyer will choose the strategy, which can
bring her the best payoffs. The advantage for each timing strategy is summarized in Figure 1.

Modeling the Supplier Participation as Corporate Real Options
Intuitively, if the buyer can predict the payoff for each timing strategy, the buyer is able to design the system which both the
buyers and suppliers can gain the highest payoff from the participation. However, the payoff for each decision depends on the
business and environmental conditions and creates the uncertainties as we estimate the investment value. Since the NPV approach
has problems in dealing with all these different uncertainties, we think the option pricing models will treat the problems better
with their ability to model asymmetric returns and to recognize the value of deferral investment (Benaroch, Kauffman 1999). By
analogy, an investment in a B2B e-commerce system can be considered as a all on a call compound option on a stock.
Similar as the first call option will give its holder the right to buy the second call option by paying the fist striking price,
investment in a B2B e-commerce infrastructure will give the buyer the ability to attract suppliers to join by paying development
costs. Just as the second call option gives the holder the right to acquire the stock by paying the second strike price, the supplier
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participation will give the buyer expected revenues by paying the connection costs. Further, just as the investor can choose not
to exercise the option on the first exercise date (if the option on that date is lower than the first strike price) or on the second
exercise date (if the option on that date is lower than the second strike price), a manager can decide not to undertake the
infrastructure development and the supplier can choose not to participate. Thus, the supplier participation is equivalent to the stock
on which the compound option is written, while the investment in the B2B e-commerce system is similar as purchasing the right
to write an option contract.

Buyers

Suppliers

Advantage of early
Investment

Participation Uncertainty

1. Gain more cost savings
from early employment

1. The power structure between buyers and
suppliers

2. Lead standard setting

2. The competition pressure in the
environment

3. Easily target specific
customers and suppliers
4. Have higher capability
to move quickly with
the market

Cost Uncertainty
1. The flexibility of IT

Advantage of
deferring investment

2. The level of information sharing/
integration

3. Have wider data
standards across the
industry
4. Have more supplier’s
commitment before
development

1. Get larger customer base
2. Reduce more customer
acquisition cost/
marketing cost
3. Gain more inventory
savings and customer
satisfaction from early
system integration

Advantage of late
participation
1. Connect to more secured
infrastructure for
information sharing

1. Avoid political infighting
2. Have more time to gain
agreement from
industrial competitors

Advantage of early
Participation

Time Uncertainty
1. The trusting climates between the suppliers
and buyers

2. Get more experienced
technical support
3. Ensure the fairness of
the pricing mechanisms
4. Get full range of services
and products

Figure 1. The Summary of Advantages for Alternative Investment Strategies
There have been a lot of attempts made to apply option theory to IT investments. Dos Santos (1991) applied Margrabe exchange
option model (1978) to determine the value of econd-stage IT projects. Two years later, Kambil, Henderson and Mohsenzadeh
(1993) introduced the option perspective to establish a linkage between many categories of IT investments and business value.
Kumar (1996) made a note to compare the difference between Black-Scholes model (1973) and Margrabe model in the treatment
of the cost of the econd-stage project. Zhu (1999) introduced Geske compound option model (1979) to treat IT investment
projects as a sequence of growth options. The most current development is from Benaroch and Kauffman (1999, 2000). They
applied Cox and Robinstein binomial option pricing model (1985) and Black-Scholes models to evaluate IT investment, with a
real case study on the Yankee-24 electronic banking network. The summaries of those models and their limitations are shown
in the Table 2.
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Table 2. The Summary of Alternative Investment Valuation Models
Investment Valuation
Models

Advantages

Limitations

1. NPV Model

-

Simple calculation, more
straightforward

2. Black-Scholes Model

-

3. Margrabe Model

-

Stochastic expected returns
and development costs
- The deferral option

- Requiring an understanding of how the
expected returns and development costs
are related

4. Cox and Robinstein
Model

-

Conceptual simplicity

- Immediately matured option
- Open-form solution, difficult to conduct
sensitivity analysis

5. Geske Model

-

Nested options

- Computational complexity
- Deterministic development costs

Stochastic expected returns
The deferral option

- Constant risk-adjusted discount rate with
no variability
- No deferral option

- Constant interest rate
- Deterministic development costs

Since the B2B e-commerce investment can be linked to a compound option, we use Geske Model as our basis. With the reference
of Santos proposed approach, we add the supplier connection cost variability into the model and eliminate the constant interest
rate. We also consider the time variability and competition pressure in supplier participation. There is little literature discusses
the estimation of alternative variability and this problem has been recognized as a limitation of option pricing models. We attempt
to propose a measure system to combine the user-oriented valuation studies (, which the focus is on ser-oriented benefits and costs
with the option valuation models. The model is described as follows:

VC = B2 N 2 ( d1 + σ 2 t1 , d 2 + σ 2 t 2 ; ρ ) − C 2 N 2 ( d1 , d 2 ; ρ ) − C1 N 1 ( d1 )

d1 =

ln( d

t2

1
B2 / B2* ) + σ 22 t1
2
σ t1

d2 =

ln( d

t2

1
B2 / C 2 ) + σ 22t 2
2
σ t2

B2* = that value of B2 such that B2 N 1 ( d 2 + σ 2 t 2 − t1 ) − C 2 N 1 ( d 2 ) − C1 = 0
VC: the value of the compound option (i.e. the value of e-marketplace investment)
B2: the current value of second-stage project (i.e. the value of supplier participation)
C1: the strike price for the first-stage project (i.e. the anticipated development costs for e-marketplace infrastructure)
C2: the strike price for the second-stage project (i.e. the anticipated development costs for supplier connection costs)
F22: the variance of the expected revenue from the second-stage project (i.e. supplier participation), computed as F22B2+ F22C2 2
FB2 FC2 rB2C2; F2B2 is variance of the rate of change of development costs of the second-stage project, F2C2 is variance of the
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rate of change of revenues of the second-stage project, and rB2C2 is correlation between development costs and revenues for
the second-stage project1
t1: The first exercise date (i.e. the time before which the option to develop the e-marketplace infrastructure must be exercised)
t2: The second exercise date (i.e. the time before which the option for the supplier to connect to the e-marketplace must be
exercised). We consider it as a normal distribution with the mean t2 and the variance F2t2 (i.e. t2 ~ N( t 2 , F2t2))
d:

is a discounted factor while considering the competitive pressure in the industry

The function, N1, is the cumulative normal distribution, and N2 is the cumulative bivariate normal distribution function with
correlation coefficient r. The variable B2* is the threshold value of B above which the compound option should be exercised.2
Other notation is explained below:
If we assume the variation in B2 and C2 is normally distributed, the F2B2 and F2C2 can be estimated by the following function:
F2B2 = nB*pB (1-pB)
F2C2 = nC*pC (1-pC)

where nB is the percentage of the fluctuation within the expectation, pB is the percentage of change above or below the expected
value (i.e. B2), and pC is the percentage of change above or below the development costs (i.e. C2).3 We canexpress nB as an implicit
function nB = nB (a1, a2, a3, a4,…, am), where ai (i=1 to m) is the environmental factor affecting the fluctuation of prediction, the
same as nC = nC (b1, b2, b3, b4,…, bk), where bi (i=1 to k) is the environmental factor affecting the fluctuation of supplier connection
costs.
Based on the discussion in section three, nB = nB (switch cost, ownership ratio, contract length) and nC = nC (IT flexibility, level
of integration). If we assume each factor of our interest has equal contribution and are the only sources to the variability, we can
calculate the variability using Cobb-Douglas function:4

nB =

1 1 1
S 3O 3C 3

nC = F

1 1
2I 2

F =

Con

+ Com
3

+ Mod

, where
I =

Int

+ Ext
2

S is the switch cost, O is ownership ratio, and C is contract length. The IT flexibility is computed by three resources:
(1) Con is the extent of connectivity, measured by the percentage of end users inside the supplier company are planned to connect
to the e-marketplace.
(2) Com is the platform compatibility, measured by the percentage of hardware inside the supplier company can support the emarketplace.
(3) Mod is the modularity of data, measured by the percentage of applications software inside the supplier company can be
transported and reused across the e-marketplace.

1

The value of rB2C2 depends on how much revenue draws from the supplier connection costs. Since the connect costs is determined by the fixed
supplier IT infrastructure (i.e. the flexibility of the existed system and the scope of use), we expect there is a low correlation between connection
costs and revenue. To simplify the computation, we assume it is zero.

2

B* is the value of supplier participation at time t1, for which the compound option value (V) at time t1 equals X1. If the actual B is above B*
at time t1, the first option will be exercised; if it is not above B*, the option expires worthless (Hull, 2000).
3

pB and pC can be obtained from the subjective estimate of the system development staff.

4

The values of those three factors are normalized, which means each value represents a relative importance of buyer-based B2B e-commerce
to all the other IT projects for the supplier.
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The level of IT integration is computed by two resources:
(1) Int is the extent of the internal integration, measured by the extent of integration of the e-marketplace with the back-end
supplier system.
(2) Ext is the extent of the external integration, measured by the percentage of transactions implemented via the e-marketplace.
The variability of time can be measured using the similar approach.
1

1

1

σ 2 = (1 − Tra ) 3 (1 − Inc ) 3 (1 − Re q ) 3
t2

We assume good trusting climates between organization and the supplier contribute to the reduction of time variability. Tra
represents the availability of the training programs, Inc is the availability of the incentives, and Req is the average responding time
to supplier’s technical requests.

Applying Game Concepts to Buyer-Based B2B E-Commerce Investment Options
The proposed compound option model provides us an estimate of B2B e-commerce system investment when both the buyer and
the supplier have the option to defer their investment. However it still doesn’t solve the question: what is the effect of
counteractions between the supplier and the buyer on the investment timing decision? The option models consider the
uncertainties most related with the assets and resources that the firm already has, but doing the option may invite competition
reaction which can turn back to affect the value of the option. For instance, the buyer can always adopt a “wait-and-see” approach
to gain the option value of waiting. However, its wait may give other competitors the chance to invite the supplier. The same
strategic concern can be applied to the supplier too. The supplier can always wait till the condition becomes more certain and
positive, but during its wait, other suppliers who participate earlier then get more access to the buyer. To address this issue, we
use a game-theoretic approach that records the possible move on either side under the competitive pressure.
Based on the discussion in section 2, we define four investment-timing scenarios and show the payoff in Figure 2.
(1) The buyer decides to invest the infrastructure immediately and the supplier then decides to participate immediately after the
infrastructure is built:
Both players don’t consider deferred entry: there is no deferral option in both sides. That means both options are exercised
immediately. Past literature (Cox and Rubinstein 1985, Santos 1991, Benaroch and Kauffman 1999) formulated this scenario
as a Cox and Rubinstein binomial option pricing problem, assuming both options are matured immediately and the payoff
on a second-stage project is the maximum of zero if development expenditures exceed its benefits (i.e. the supplier will not
participate if revenues do not exceed connection costs). VB represents the investment value in this scenario (Figure 2 (I)). B1
is the expected revenue from the infrastructure development, independent from the revenue of supplier participation; pi is
the probability of supplier participation; B2i is the value that will actually be realized for each possible outcome of supplier
participation; r is risk-based discount rate for the investment. We assume the buyer and the supplier share the option value
equally, resulting in a (VB/2, VB /2) payoff for each firm.
(2) The buyer decides to defer its investment while considering the uncertainties of supplier participation, but once the
investment is made, the supplier participates immediately:
Only the buyer considers deferred entry: the investment possesses only one deferral option at buyer side. Because the
development cost is fixed at the time the buyer decides to invest in the B2B e-commerce system, we don’t need to consider
the variability of the development costs happened in the company side. It makes more sense to employ Black-Scholes model
for its assumed deterministic exercise price and plain option (no nested options involved). VS represents the investment value
in this scenario (Figure 2 (II)). F12 is the variance in its expected return of the infrastructure investment and e-rt1 is the present
value factor for risk-neutral investors. The payoff for each firm is (VS/2, VS /2).
(3) The buyer invests the infrastructure immediately, but the supplier defers its participation under uncertainty
In this scenario, the supplier participation is viewed as an option, while the exercise of this option leads to the acquisition
of a technology. Different from scenario II, the supplier connection cost is uncertain at the time the B2B e-commerce system
416
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infrastructure starts to build. Thus, we can’t take the development cost of the supplier participation as a deterministic value.
It is more suitable to employ Margrabe model, which determines the value of an option to exchange one risky asset for
another using stochastic development costs. VM represents the investment value in this scenario (Figure 2 (III)). The payoff
for each firm is (VM/2, VM /2), where is the Margrabe option value plus the expected cash flow from the B2B e-commerce
system infrastructure investment.
(4) The buyer decides to defer its investment, same as the supplier
When both company and supplier decide to wait, it can be seen as a compound option, which has been discussed in section
three. Both firms are able to employ deferral option, where the connection costs of supplier participation is uncertain. VC
represents the investment value in this scenario (Figure 2 (IV)). The payoff for each firm is (VC/2, VC /2).
Supplier
Invest
Buyer

(I)

VB = −C1 +

Wait
(III)

B1 +
(1 + r )T1

n

∑ pi Max[0, (B2i /(1 + r )T1 +T2 ) − C2 ]

VM = −C1 +

i =1

C2 N (

Invest

VS = B1N (

ln(B1 / C1)rt1

σ1 t1

−
C1e rt1 N (

Wait

− C2 +

ln(d

t2

t2

B2 / C2 ) + σ 22t2 / 2
)−
σ 2 t2

B2 / C2 ) + σ 22t2 / 2
−σ

σ 2 t2

2 t2 )

V V
( W , W)
2
2

V V
( B , B)
2 2

(II)

ln(d
B1
+ B2 N (
(1 + r )T1

+ 0.5σ1 t1 ) −

ln(B1 / C1)rt1

σ1 t1

+ 0.5σ1 t1 − σ1 t1 )

(IV)
VC = B2 N2 (d1 + σ 2 t1 , d2 + σ 2 t2 ; ρ )
− C2 N 2 (d1, d2 ; ρ ) − C1N1(d1)

t
d 1 B2
+ +
(1 + r )t1 T1 T2

V V
( S , S)
2 2

V V
( C , C)
2 2

Figure 2. Payoffs for Company and Supplier in Four Investment-timing Scenarios

A Case for Using the Game-Based Option Model to Justify E-Marketplace Investment
In this section, we use the proposed game-based option model to do a post hoc analysis of a decision by manufacturers in
consumer packaged good (CPG) industry on whether and when to develop an industrial e-marketplace Transora while taking the
supplier response and competitive pressure into account. We simplified this decision as a one buyer (manufacturer in CPG
industry) and one supplier game, where the buyer invests the e-marketplace infrastructure and invites the supplier to participate.
That is, we only consider the impact of supplier participation on the success of Transora. To analyze the investment decision the
manufacturer faced in 2000, we used the predicted data from Transora public Web site (Figure 3) to require all the parameters
we need for each model. Based on the Forrester research, 4.7% of industrial sales will go through e-marketplace. We assume the
CPG industry will apply the same adoption rate.
The payoffs for the manufacturer and the supplier in four investment-timing scenarios are shown in Figure 4. When manufacturer
adopts a deferral option and supplier chooses to participate immediately, both parties can have highest payoffs.
The logic behind the results is as follows. The development of Transora involved considerable uncertainty. First is about the
participation uncertainties. The ingredients are not easily interchangeable, which makes producers very picky and specific. The
pepper from one supplier, for example, can be very different from others. Second comes from cost uncertainties. The high level
of supplier fragmentation makes document standardization and process synchronization, such as for ordering and invoicing, across
tens or even hundreds of different information systems a daunting task. For example, a cake producer needs to buy each ingredient
milk, sugar, floor, chocolate, etc. from numerous distributors located across the globe. In addition, the characteristics of
ingredients are hard to describe and lack of standardization, creating additional challenge for data and application modulation.
For example, a case of tomatoes carries with many variables and can have a long list of description like how big they are, what
color they are, whether they are organically grown, etc. A third source of uncertainty is time uncertainty. Suppliers may fear that
online marketplaces will break up long-standing relationships between them and their customers, which can seriously delay the
2002 — Eighth Americas Conference on Information Systems
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time they decide to participate. Those uncertainties may make suppliers to adopt a deferral option. As a result, to make both parties
better off, the analysis tells us the manufacturers should have more time to gain the consensus from the suppliers and have more
supplier commitment before development. Manufacturer deferral option can digest most supplier uncertainty and encourage their
participation.
Current Performance of Transora
• Number of total manufacturers
• Initial capital investment
• Number of active users per
total members (acquisition effectiveness)
• Total sales revenue
(half of the industry)
• Software development cost
• Average transaction fee per
dollar of transaction
• Number of employees

56
250M
25%
600B
180M
5%
250

Expected transaction revenue
600B*25%*5%*4.7%= 353M

Estimated hosting support requirement
for collaboration (from Transora)
Large manufacturer

Overall E-market Performance
(Forrester Research)

4-6

Expected cost reduction (in million)

• Percentage of U.S. industry
sales going through e-market
(Adoption of E-market)

4.7%

Perceived Benefits
• Error reduction
Forecast accuracy improvement
Inventory accuracy improvement
• Reduced operating cost
Inventory reduction
In stock improvement
Catalog production cost
Customer acquisition cost
(Promotion cost)
Distribution cost
• Improved quality
Sales growth
Service level improvement

Overall average cost for all entries across industries
(2000 survey from www.hwdco.com)
% of Sales
Transportation
3.54%
Warehousing
2.39%
Order Entry
0.76%
Administration
0.85%
Inventory carrying
2.03%

10-40%
5-15%
30-70%
1-4%
20-35%
18%
50%-90%

• Error reduction:
0.06*14*[(4,6)*(0.1,0.4)+(4,6)*(0.05-0.15)]
• Operating cost reduction
Inventory reduction: 150,000*2.03%*(0.3,0.7)
In stock improvement:
150,000*2.39%*(0.01-0.04)
Catalog production cost:
150,000*0.76%*(0.2-0.35)
Customer acquisition cost:
6,000*0.5*0.18
Distribution cost
150,000*3.54%*(0.5-0.9)
• Improved quality
Sales growth:150,000*(0.02-0.25)
Service level improvement
150,000*0.85%*(0.05-0.02)

0.51-2.78
913.5-2,131.5
35.85-143.40
228.00-399.00
54
2,655-4,779
3,000-37,500
6.375-25.5

Total perceived benefits (Manufacturers) 6.89B-45.03B

2-25%
0.5-2%

Figure 3. Current Performance and Perceived Benefits from Transora

Discussion
Here, we are interested in using sensitivity analysis to determine the impact of different input values on investment opportunities.
Manufacturer Development costs: In the buyer-jointed industrial e-marketplace, one feature is relatively low development costs
compared with buyer own private e-marketplace or e-procurement systems. Some of the smaller companies who don have such
deep pockets can take advantage of someone else bearing the cost of that capability. As a result, while evaluating the investment
strategies for other buyer-based e-marketplaces, let us assume that the infrastructure development costs rise by a certain
percentage (e.g., C1 changes from 8.1 million to 10.1 million). Would the investment strategy applied to Transora still make
sense? The result is showed in Figure 5, which the solid line shows Transora case, and the dotted line shows the case with higher
development costs. The figure tells us the higher development costs decreases the overall payoffs for each party and the decrease
is larger in invest strategy than wait strategy (b>a). In addition, the higher development costs make supplier attempt to delay the
participation as well (the angle d is larger than angle c, which means supplier becomes less interested in immediate investment).
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Supplier
Invest
(I)

(III)
Long wait
(0.03, 0.03)

(0.5, 0.5)
Invest

Payoffs for Manufacturer

Short wait
(1.28, 1.28)
(II)

Manufacturer Payoff
(Million)

Manufacturer

Wait

(IV)
Long wait
(-0.11,-0.11)

(1.37, 1.37)**
Wait

1.6
1.4
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
-0.2

invest
wait

1

2

3

The time supplier joins e-marketplace

Short wait
(0.27,0.27)
Assumption:
1. The infrastructure development costs (C1): capital investment + software investment+employee salary (Assume
each manufacturer has equal investment) – (250M+180M)/56+250*30,000)=15.5M
2. B1 -- transaction revenues: 25%*600000M*0.05*0.047=353M, 353M/56=6.3M
3. R: 7% risk-free interest rate
4. Connection cost: $400*5*12*100+100*30,000=4.4M (Assume 100 employees worked on this project. The
monthly software subscription fee is $400 for each application. )
5.The expected revenue: 6890M/750=9.2M (Suppose 750 participants)
6. T1=2years
7. T2=0.5 year
8. t1= 1year
9. t2= 2year± z(0.975)* σ t2=0.5±1.96* σ t2
10. σ: Pb--75% (conservative prediction), Pc=0.5, s:0.1, c:0.1, o:0.1, con:0.1, com:0.1, mod: 0.1, int:0.1, ext:0.1,
tra: 0.1, inc: 0.1, req: 0.1
11. d=0.25

Figure 4. The Payoffs Calculated for the Manufacturer and the Supplier in Four
Investment-Timing Scenarios Using Data from Transora

Payoffs for Manufacturer

Manufacturer Payoff
(Million)

1.5
1

a

d
c

0.5
0
-0.5

b

0

invest

1

2

wait

-1
-1.5
The time supplier participates

Figure 5. Sensitivity Analysis for Higher Infrastructure Development Costs
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The change points out that the complicated infrastructure makes the option to defer entry more preferable. For the manufacturer,
it means that it is more important to solve the conflicts between the parties and gain more commitment before the development
than to gain more market share by quick entry and wide service provision. For the suppliers, they put more concern on security,
integration, and trust during the transaction.
Supplier connection costs: In the industry e-marketplace, the connection costs, or lock-in costs are moderate compared with
buyer-based e-procurement system. The reason is the public e-marketplace setting is often more standardized and less specialized
than private e-marketplace setting. We are interested in whether the high connection costs will change the decision we made for
Transora. To see the impact of connection costs, we include the result in Figure 6 for the connection costs C2, changing from 4.4
M to 5.4 M. The result shows that, although the supplier has the lock-in cost concern, if the manufacturer can enter into the market
as soon as possible, providing services corresponding to the market change, the cost savings from early employment can outweigh
the high lock-in costs. Both manufacturers and suppliers will be better off (the highest payoff changes from A to B).

Manufacturer Payoff
(Million)

Payoffs for Manufacturer
1.6
1.4
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
-0.2
-0.4

(A)
(B)

invest
wait

0

1

2

The time supplier joins e-marketplace

Figure 6. Sensitivity Analysis for Higher Supplier Connection Costs
Environmental variability: In section three, we discussed three uncertainties involved in the investment decisions. In some
industries, manufacturers and suppliers are more certain about the expected benefits and costs than in CPG market. For example,
the relationship between suppliers and buyers in auto industry are more dedicated, which means the relationship involves high
switch costs and long coordination history. As a result, the investment strategy derived from Transora may not be applied to auto
industry. To see the impact of those uncertainties on the investment decisions, we change the variability from 0.5 to 0.2 and the
result is shown in Figure 7. It is interesting to note that as supplier is more certain about the expected revenue and cost, which
means information sharing between the two parties is more symmetric, the manufacturer will become more careful to evaluate
its entry strategy and may delay its investment. From the Figure 7, we can see the low variability decreases the payoff of
investment strategy but increases the payoff of wait-and-see strategy. Suppliers become even more eager to participate (the angle
d is larger than the angle c). As a result, to make both parties better off, manufacturer has to focus on providing variety of service
to give the suppliers promising benefits and at the same time avoid the political infighting among different interest groups.
Payoffs for Manufacturer

Manufacturer Payoff
(Million)

1.5

c

1
0.5

invest

cc
0
1

2

d

wait
3

-0.5
-1
The time supplier joins e-marketplace

Figure 7. Sensitivity Analysis for Lower Supplier Uncertainty
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The summary of the impact of each factor on the determination of investment decision is shown in the following table.
Table 2. Summary of the Effect of Input Variables and its Implications
Factor
Development costs

Effect on invest strategies
Complicated infrastructure
design favors the wait
strategy for both parties.

Connection costs

High lock-in costs
encourages manufacturer
early entry, but supplier
may prefer deferral option

Cost and benefit
uncertainties

Low uncertainties
encourages supplier
participation, but
manufacturers may prefer
deferral option

Implication for practice
As the infrastructure is complicated, expanding service provision
may not be the best strategy to attract supplier participation. Getting
the high payoff depends on whether the B2B e-commerce can
provide secured, integrated, and private transaction environment.
As the lock-in costs are high, although the supplier is tentative to
participate, it may not be preferable for manufacturers to wait till
getting more commitment from suppliers. The high payoff depends
on manufacturer capability to move quickly with the market and
provide promising services to suppliers.
As the supplier is more certain about the costs and benefits, it may
not be preferable for manufacturers to enter into the market quickly.
The high payoff depends on whether the manufacturer can ensure
the promising benefits and gain agreement from different parties,
avoiding unnecessary political infighting

Conclusion and Future Research
This paper examines the impact of supplier participation uncertainty on evaluating the investment value of buyer-based ecommerce systems through a game-based option valuation model. The contribution of this research is multi-folded: First, the
research applies the compound option model to improve the pitfalls of traditional NPV approach and plain option models (ex:
Black and Schole model), so uncertainties can be considered both in the buyer side and the supplier side, which is more related
with B2B e-commerce system investment. Besides that, we also enhance the original compound option model by adding the time
variability and development cost variability, so the uncertainties related with supplier lock-in costs and time to the market can
be considered while estimating the investment value. In addition, we develop a measurement system to estimate the variability,
linking the user-oriented benefit/cost studies with the option models. For example, to effectively estimate the variability of
expected revenues in the option model, we suggest the use of three measures: switch costs, ownership ratio, and contract length.
Although the validity of those measures has to be further justified, the approach provides a practical way to estimate multiple
variances in the option model. At last, we add the dimension of competitive advantage by using the game theories, which gives
us a way to evaluate the counteraction between the suppliers and buyers.
This research demonstrates that the timing of supplier participation is determined by the locking costs, the complication of system
infrastructure, and environmental uncertainties including participation uncertainty, cost uncertainty, and time uncertainty. Buyer
should be carefully to choose right investment strategy so both the supplier and buyer can be better off. For example, although
the CPG industry exists high participation and cost uncertainties, supplier is willing to participate early if the manufacturer can
adopt a deferral strategy to get more time to gain the agreement from different parties, to design wide scope of services, and to
gain more supplier commitment before the development.
However, the model has its limitations. We have to assume the buyer and the supplier have the same reasoning of thinking. In
the traditional compound option model, the first option and the second option is bought by the same company, but now the first
option is from the buyer and the second option is from the supplier. Since it is common in the economic theory to assume
everyone will choose the behavior that is best to herself. This assumption should not affect our evaluation results too much.
Secondly, we only consider the competition and uncertainty in the supplier side. However, for some e-marketplaces, the founders
are the competitors in the same industries. The uncertainties and the competition among those industrial competitors should also
affect the investment decisions. As a result, the model presented here can be extended to a two-stage games in the future where
the competition between the buyers can be viewed as the first stage game and the equilibrium derived affects the second stage
game that is the competition between the suppliers.
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